Sebastian's interesting comment on my 13 October post has set me thinking. So why did the Mongols leave Europe alone after 1241? Wikipedia's entry "Mongol Invasion of Europe" includes the following.
Some western historians attribute European survival to Mongol unwillingness to fight in the more densely populated German principalities, where the wetter weather affected their bows. The territory of Western Europe, with more forests and with many castles along with many opportunities for the heavy cavalry to counter-attack possibly made Western Europe a more formidable opponent. Also, despite the steppe tactics of the Avars and early Hungarians, both were defeated by Western States in the 9th and 10th centuries. A significant number of important castles and towns in Hungary had also resisted the formidable and infamous Mongol siege tactics.
But the probable answer for Batu's stopping after the Mohi River, and the destruction of the Hungarian army, was that he never intended to advance further. He had made the Russian conquest safe for the next ten generations, and when the Great Khan died and he rushed back to Mongolia to put in his claim for power, it ended his westward expansion. Subutai's recall at the same time left the Mongol armies without their spiritual head and primary strategist.
Subsequently, Batu Khan planned to invade Europe as far as the Atlantic Ocean, however Mongol infighting delayed him until 1255. Batu died before having the chance to implement his plan, and his son also died before being able to invade Europe. Afterwards, Mongol ambitions largely were drawn in other directions. However, one further attempt was made against Europe. Again from Wikipedia:
In the mid-1280s Nogai Khan led an invasion of Hungary alongside with Talabuga. Nogai lead an army that ravaged Transylvania with success, where cities like Reghin, Braşov and Bistriţa were plundered and ravaged. However Talabuga, who led an army in Northern Hungary, was stopped by the heavy snow of the Carpathians and the invading force was defeated near Pest by the royal army of Ladislaus IV and ambushed by the Székely in the return. As with later invasions, it was repelled handily, the Mongols losing much of their invading force. The outcome could not have contrasted more sharply with the 1241 invasion, mostly due to the reforms of Béla IV, which included advances in military tactics and, most importantly, the widespread building of stone castles, both in response to the crushing defeat of the Hungarian Kingdom in 1241.
Living in Transylvania, I can testify to the preponderence of post-1241 and post-1280's stone fortifications around ancient towns, villages and even churches. Some of these repelled Tatar invasions into the 1700's, surviving late enough to become bullet-riddled during late medieval sieges. I can well believe how heavy snow could have stopped an army in the Carpathians. The roused Magyars and Szekely would have been fierce opponents, indeed it is still said in Transylvania that "a Szekely's identity card is his pocket knife." It does seem that the Mongols won many victories because of their opponents' mistakes. For example, defenders being drawn out of a fortress by a feigned retreat. Word must have got around about that kind of elementary mistake. The surprise is that it happened so often before the West learnt.
So why did I advance the idea that the Mongols found Europe a poor province to loot? In part, after a week with Tim Cope, the only person within living memory to have ridden the Mongol horde's route, and unusually well read in the history of the Mongols. Tim is, in many ways, a champion of the Mongols, upholding their positive values for a much needed reassessment. Riding their route gave him a unique view of the world as they saw it. I suppose that the Mongol leaders made what, in the modern world, we would call a Cost : Benefit Analysis. There were richer targets located closer. Europe was a costly, time consuming place to raid. The Hungarians had learnt from previous reverses, and that was the final nail in the coffin of a Mongol invasion of Europe.
The Mongol Blitzkreig was only really effective against those that failed to grasp Mongol tactics. Once enemy strategy had caught up, Mongol forces were open to defeat. In due course, the Teutonic Knights and the Wehrmacht (to name but two) duly suffered analagous fates. Europe was saved, again and again.
I think that, in our own separate ways, Sebastian and I are both right. We are looking from different angles. Yes, the Mongols must have been well engaged in China. They had campaigns against Bulgaria, Poland, Thrace, etc, too, each seemingly undermanned because of large actions closer to home. However, I think that the relatively small rewards in Central Europe, combined with the risks inherent in fighting a prepared and increasingly efficient enemy, also played their part in Mongol calculations.
How often are even great powers allowed but one roll of the dice?